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This book is a revised and expanded version of the author’s 2007 Benedict Lectures at 
Boston University. Rosen deliberately aimed to keep the tone informal and accessible to 
non-specialists, and in my view he was mostly successful in this. Relatedly, the book is 
short and sweet in length: for example, the text proper is only 160 pages; a 9-page preface, 5 
pages of light endnotes, and an 8-page index round out the work. Because of these features, 
and because of the quality of the book’s content, I suspect it will become a touchstone or 
“first stop” for many who want to get up to speed on the philosophical threads making up 
the fabric of current debates about dignity. 
 
The book lives up to its subtitle, since its three chapters explore three related areas where 
the history of different meanings of dignity intersect. The first and perhaps most ambitious 
chapter includes an overview of the entire book (pages 8-10) but focuses especially on the 
relation between the historical discussions of dignity by philosophers and the post-war use 
of dignity in the 1948 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law) of the Federal Republic of Germany. The second and longest 
chapter focuses on recent laws and court cases where dignity was invoked in Germany, 
France, and the United States. The third and shortest chapter looks critically at the question 
of why we have a duty to treat the dead with dignity, especially since they seem unable to 
benefit from such treatment.   
 
Kant and his interlocutors (and interpreters) figure prominently in each chapter. But Rosen 
balances his summaries of typical Kantian moves with his own provocative proposals. As 
he explains in the preface, “What I have to say about Kant and the idea of duty disagrees 
with a great deal of what has been written on the subject…To revert to my chess analogy, I 
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am in the position of someone who wants to propose making a radically unorthodox move 
at a frequently reached point in the game” (xv). 
 
The remainder of this review will highlight key moves and tensions in each of Rosen’s three 
chapters. 
 
Chapter One’s title, “The Shibboleth of All Empty-Headed Moralists,” echoes Arthur 
Schopenhauer’s complaint that phrases like “the dignity of man” often serve to conceal the 
fact that the thinker using the phrase has no basis for her morals. Now, Rosen is willing to 
concede that, “by the time that [Schopenhauer] was writing (1839), the various strands of 
“human dignity” had indeed become fused into a cliché of pious humanitarianism” (41). But 
this concession reflects Rosen’s broader argument that, contra Schopenhauer, invoking 
dignity can often function, not as a smokescreen for ignorance, but as a legitimate appeal to 
one or more distinct parts of morality.  
 
Rosen is aware that contemporary philosophers (such as Ruth Macklin, James Griffin, and 
Joel Feinberg) occasionally argue that “dignity” is invoked as shorthand for other moral 
notions (like autonomy, rational agency, and/or the capacity for making claims). But his 
historical survey begins with writers like Aquinas, Bacon, Bossuet, Cicero, Milton, Pascal, 
Pico della Mirandola, and Pope Gelasius I in order to establish three important strands in the 
history of “dignity”: (1) dignity as status, (2) dignity as intrinsic or inherent value, and (3) 
dignity as manner, character, behavior, or bearing that is dignified (cf. 40, 54). This sets the 
stage for Rosen’s detailed sketch of the views of dignity held by Kant and his 
contemporaries like Schiller. It also informs his treatment of later accounts of dignity by 
thinkers as diverse as Marx, Nietzsche, and Popes Leo XIII and John Paul II. 
 
Ideas of equality, Rosen notes, have a complicated relationship with these three strands of 
thinking about dignity. Sometimes they are fused, as when thinkers affirm the equal dignity 
of each human person. But other times they are in tension, as when thinkers cash out an 
individual’s dignity in terms of her unique relationship to others that are in some sense 
“above” her (e.g. God, and/or other human persons). 
 
Building on strand (3), Rosen adds the strand of (4) dignity as treating someone with 
dignity. He clarifies this with a distinction between “respect-as-observance” and “respect-
as-respectfulness.” On the former: “Just as I respect the speed limit by driving below a 
certain speed, I respect rights by not infringing them (if they are negative) or doing what 
they require if they are positive” (57). On the latter: “To treat someone with dignity is (it 
seems natural to say) to respect their dignity...To respect someone’s dignity by treating 
them with dignity requires that one shows them respect, either positively, by acting toward 
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them in a way that gives expression to one’s respect, or, at least, negatively, by refraining 
from behavior that would show disrespect” (58). 
  
Chapter Two (“The Legislation of Dignity”) builds on these distinctions and applies them to 
several laws and judicial decisions that invoked “dignity” for one position or another. The 
cases include a challenge to a local French law against dwarf-tossing, a punishment of a 
German official who threatened to torture a man he reasonably suspected of kidnapping a 
child (in order to discover the child’s whereabouts in time to save his life), and a challenge 
to a German law allowing commercial airliners to be shot down in cases where hijackers 
planned to use the airliners as weapons.   
 
For example, in the dwarf-tossing case, Rosen argues that the sequence of decisions by 
different courts of appeal show how “the ubiquity of dignity in current legal discourse 
masks a great deal of disagreement and sheer confusion” (67). The final decision upholding 
the ban on dwarf-tossing, Rosen argues, illustrates this well: “having left open the content 
of the idea of human dignity as a fundamental foundation for morality, those whose 
business it was to apply the concept of dignity in a legal context ended up giving it content 
by drawing on the very different concept of the dignified—requiring [the dwarf in this case] 
to behave in a dignified way” (77). 
  
Rosen also spends much of Chapter Two discussing the connections between the Kantian 
and Catholic roots of the Grundgesetz, as well as the connections between these roots 
themselves. It gets especially complicated over “who are the bearers of human dignity” (see 
93, 102-3). Are such bearers restricted merely to “those human beings who are actively 
capable of exercising rational agency” (as some neo-Kantians would suggest)? Or do they 
include all human beings, even those who are not yet born (as Catholics and several German 
courts have maintained)? 
 
Along the way, Rosen rehearses the argument that, despite the attractiveness of Kant’s 
Formula of Humanity (“So act that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”), it 
does not give us a determinate picture of our obligations: “neither of the two parts of the 
Formula of Humanity gives us an obvious or easy way of settling what is and what isn’t 
morally permissible” (86). And he shows us how it is difficult to find a consistent and 
plausible interpretation of the way the Germans applied “dignity” in their handling of the 
cases of threatening-the-kidnapper (the so-called “Daschner trial”) and shooting-down-the-
hijacked-plane (the so-called “Air Safety Law”). He closes the chapter with a brief look at 
the connections between dignity and autonomy in recent US Supreme Court decisions. 
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Chapter Three (“Duty to Humanity”) explores Rosen’s view that “the universally held belief 
that we have a duty to treat dead bodies with respect represents a deep puzzle for moral 
philosophy” (124). He explains why this is a puzzle in the first place and then examines 
several proposals for resolving it before introducing his own. This chapter is approximately 
one-half the length of either the first or the second chapters, but it builds on his proposed 
“fourth strand” of the meanings of dignity (dignity as treating someone with dignity). 
 
Rosen notes that many are attracted to the view that an action, to be good, must benefit 
someone. But then how could we have a duty—how could it be good—to treat a corpse with 
dignity? After all, who benefits from such treatment? Rosen resists a purely sociobiological 
story of taboos surrounding dead bodies as both evidentially and morally inadequate. He 
also resists the idea that an action must alter a person’s awareness in a positive way for it to 
benefit that person. But he does not accept the sorts of solutions offered by Plato or G. E. 
Moore either, which posit ideal realms or intrinsic goodnesses that are just “out there” to be 
promoted or participated in. And he does not think positing such things would help with his 
corpse puzzle anyway. “What good thing would be produced and continue to exist if the last 
sentient being in the universe were to treat the corpse of the next-to-last one with dignity?” 
(138) 
 
His own solution is “a position that is currently so unfashionable that I cannot think of any 
moral philosopher who defends it” (138). He says: “we have a duty to treat a corpse with 
dignity just because one of the ways in which we have a duty to act is that we should 
perform acts that are expressive of our respect” (139-40). One of the most interesting 
passages in the book is worth quoting at some length (although not fully):  
 
I am saying, am I not, that we have the duty to act in ways that express respect—but 
to whom am I to express that respect? Surely “expression” is a communicative act. 
Would the last sentient being in the universe still have such a duty, even if there 
were no one to listen to her? My answer—oddly enough, you might think—is 
yes…Put this way, duty-based morality sounds like an example of ethics carried out, 
as Nietzsche would put it, under the shadow of God—even those who, officially, do 
not believe in God, Nietzsche alleges, still think and act in ways that make sense 
only on the assumption of the existence of an all-seeing, judging God. If God is not 
there to hear, why express respect? The duty theorist has, I think, no further reply: 
he or she must simply appeal to the conviction that, nonetheless, the expression of 
respect would remain a duty, even if there is no one else to perceive it.” (141-2) 
 
Rosen finishes the chapter by meditating on several passages of Kant, especially those that 
focus on a moral agent’s duties towards herself. Kant backed up this “ethics of reverence” 
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with some distinctive metaphysical claims, but Rosen thinks that those are dispensable. 
“That we might have such a duty [to respect humanity] towards things—corpses of fetuses, 
for example—that are not themselves human and will not benefit from our behavior toward 
them seems to me persuasive even if we do not think of humanity in Kant’s transcendental 
terms…our duties are so deep a part of us that we could not be the people that we are 
without having them. In failing to respect the humanity of others we actually undermine 
humanity in ourselves.” (157) 
 
Regardless of how one evaluates the prospects of this last argument, I think that Rosen has 
constructed a valuable book that will keep us debating dignity for years to come. 
 
 
